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Abstract: The property rights and agency cost theory of enterprises suggests
that public ownership should perform less efficiently and profitably than private
ownership. However, the existing empirical evidence provides weak support for
this hypothesis. Numerous studies of Western capital markets and Chinese state
enterprises have examined the relationship between ownership structure and
performance. Agency theory suggests that when owners do not manage a firm
themselves, a conflict of interest arises between the owners (principals) and
managers (agents). Researchers have argued that government ownership is inferior
to private ownership in competitive markets because it prioritizes social and
political goals over value maximization, hiring decisions are often based on
political influence rather than ability, and higher transaction costs are involved.
This study investigated the influence of two factors, listing on the Korea
Exchange and degree of state ownership, on performance using annual data for
51 companies in Korea for 1999-2009. We found that, on average, performance
(measured by productivity, profitability, and efficiency) was positively influenced
by public listing and negatively influenced by the degree of state ownership.
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INTRODUCTION
No matter how a state-owned enterprise (SOE) is defined, we know what it is. It
might not be necessary to emphasize the importance of SOEs in an economy, as these
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companies—such as Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), Korea Land Housing
Corporation, Incheon International Airport Corporation, and Korea Water Resources
Corporation—have clearly played vital roles. The proportion of SOEs in an economy
is often estimated as the budget ratio of SOEs to government, the ratio of value-added
to GDP, or SOE employment as a proportion of the total working-age population.
According to Yoon (1998), an SOE, like other companies, produces and sells goods
and services in a market under the government’s control as an owner. The comparison
of these companies in different countries is somewhat difficult, because there are no
absolute criteria for SOE status in terms of ownership structure, assets, or employment.
To address this, international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) have tried to collect data on the economic value
of SOEs.
Privatization of SOEs is another broad issue. There has been great controversy
about the role of an SOE. Some have argued that the problem of market failure should
be addressed in SOEs, taking their inefficient management into consideration. Others
have argued that SOEs should be privatized and the issue of market failure should be
solved by regulations, taxation, or subsidies. Still others, while not calling for 100
percent privatization, have argued that SOEs should reveal the extent of government
subsidization in order to ensure fair competition and transparency, and that governance
should be improved.
Without substantive verification, hypotheses of privatization remain theoretical.
The theoretical conflict about privatization calls sufficient empirical evidence. The
impacts of privatization of SOEs appear to be diverse, as no one theory or hypothesis
explains all of them. It is generally accepted that an SOE has not only a market-related
but also a social purpose. However, whether the inefficiency brought by market failure
outweighs the problem of accountability and transparency of state ownership (so-
called government failure) is not a theoretical but an empirical problem. Abusive
insider transactions are frequently reported as one of the most serious breaches of
good corporate governance around the world. Such transactions are used by controlling
shareholders or other company insiders as a mechanism for extracting private benefits
at the cost of other shareholders. To this end, the OECD principles recommend full
disclosure of insider transactions whether or not they have been executed at arm’s
length principle. It is difficult to identify when parties to a transaction are effectively
related when both are controlled by the state. This is particularly the case in countries
where state ownership is pervasive, such as China.
The Korean government has planned and implemented privatization programs
several times since the 1980s in order to bring more competition and transparency
to SOEs. In 1997, the government enacted the Law on Structural Improvement in
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Management and Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises with a clear privatization
plan for SOEs. However, this has been challenged by the fact that the implementation
plan did not correspond to the intent of the law, which was to enhance efficiency and
autonomy in management and improve performance.
The Korean privatization program has had both successes and failures. Before 1990,
KEPCO started to sell its share, and there were other moves toward privatization in
manufacturing, transportation including airlines, banks, the stock exchange, and Pohang
Steel Corporation (POSCO). Despite a major privatization effort in 1993, only 22 out
of 58 companies actually sold their shares. In 1998, the privatization program led by
the Planning and Budget Commission achieved complete privatization of POSCO,
Korea Heavy Industries Corporation, Korea Chemical Corporation, Korea Technology
Banking Corporation, and National Textbook Corporation and phased privatization of
Korea Telecom Corporation, Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation, Korea Oil
Pipeline Corporation, KEPCO, Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), and Korea District
Heating Corporation. Among these, KEPCO, KOGAS, and Korea District Heating
Corporation, as market-type SOEs, have remained subject to governance control and
management performance evaluation by the government according to the Act on the
Management of Public Institutions. In recent years, privatization of Korea Railroad
Corporation, Incheon International Airport Corporation, Korea Housing Guarantee
Co., Korea Airport Corporation, Busan Port Authority, and Incheon Port Authority has
been hotly debated in the National Assembly.
Researchers have argued that government ownership is inferior to private ownership
in competitive markets because it prioritizes social and political goals over value maxi-
mization, hiring decisions are often based on political influence rather than ability, and
higher transaction costs are involved.
This study analyzed the influence of state ownership on the performance of Korean
SOEs. It investigated whether market governance resulting from listing on the Korea
Exchange institution is an efficient way to improve performance. In addition to the
type of ownership, it also examined the extent to which the degree of government
ownership affected performance. If it can be established that different forms of owner-
ship produce different results, it would be possible to design more efficient forms of
governance than uniform control by the government.
The next section of this article reviews the economic theories and empirical evidence
on the efficiency and productivity of public and private enterprises. This is followed
by analysis of the influence of governance structure on performance—in other words,
productivity, profitability, and efficiency—using data from 51 firms for 1999-2009.
Finally, conclusions, discussion, and policy implications are presented.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework
Market failure, because of its strong competitive environment assumption is one
of the most important sources of government intervention to the market. It is clearly
unreasonable to use profitability measures as evidence of allocative efficiency or
inefficiency in contexts where there are natural monopoly characteristics or other serious
market failures. In competitive markets, however, profitability measures can be used
as indicators of allocative efficiency because normatively appropriate deviations from
profit maximization will be minimal. For these reasons, it would be hard to make a
direct comparison between SOEs and private companies.
The sociopolitical goals of SOEs tend to be ignored in many comparative empirical
analyses. The lower profits do not necessarily represent higher costs and technical
inefficiencies but rather social outputs such as lower-priced provision of public utilities
and universal services. This argument is difficult to refute to the extent that the posited
social benefits are external to the SOE and, consequently, extremely difficult to measure.
Even if one believes there are external benefits, it is useful to examine profitability
differences between private companies (PCs), SOEs, and mixed enterprises (MEs)1 in
order to get a handle on their regulated price (Yarrow and Jasinski, 1996).2
Williamson (2002) showed that transaction costs of organizing transactions in
market (M) and hierarchies (H) is a function of asset specificity (k). The bureaucratic
burdens of hierarchy place it at an initial disadvantage (k = 0), but the cost differences
between markets M (k) and hierarchy H (k) narrow as asset specificity builds up, and
they eventually reverse as the need for cooperative adaptation becomes greater (k > 0).
Provision can further be made for the hybrid mode of organization X (k), in which
hybrids are viewed as market-preserving credible contracting modes that possess
adaptive attributes located between classical markets and hierarchies.
When the social benefits of SOEs are improperly estimated, the benefits are internal
to the SOE in the form of higher wage levels and perquisites or higher aggregate SOE
employment. Such social benefits are a form of producer surplus, as illustrated by
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1. Mixed enterprises are semi private and semi public companies such as their partial shares
are sold to the private sector.
2. OECD recommends leveling the playing field between SOEs and private companies, so
lowering prices for provision of public utilities or other public services should be subsidized
by the government with separate accounting for commercial and noncommercial activities
for the purpose of transparency.
Boardman and Vining(1989) very clearly.
Another source of potential inefficiency is explained by the principal-agent model.
The relationship between government leaders who make policies and appoint the chief
executive officers of the SOEs, and the populace whose welfare depends at least partly
upon what government does, might be understood through this model. The underlying
theme of most of the rent-seeking analysis is based on the firm’s attempts to escape the
invisible hand of the market and to redirect policy proposals for its own advantage.
Whereas traditional neoclassical welfare economics assumes government to be an
exogenous force, trying to do good, neoclassical political economists argue that
government is at least partially endogenous and the policies it institutes will reflect
vested interests in society (Colander, 1984).
Empirical Evidence
Boardman and Vining (1989) found that the empirical evidence for the property
rights theory of the firm showed that SOEs perform less efficiently and less profitably
than private enterprises. This model was estimated using the 500 largest manufacturing
and mining corporations in the world outside the United States as compiled by Fortune
magazine in 1983. The result suggests that MEs and SOEs are significantly less prof-
itable and efficient than PCs. It also suggests that partial privatization, where there is
no substantial difference in performance between SOEs and MEs, may not be the best
strategy for improving performance.
Vining and Boardman (1992) estimated the effect of ownership type on perfor-
mance, using data on the 500 largest nonfinancial corporations in Canada. The results
showed that PCs have higher profitability and efficiency than MEs, with SOEs consis-
tently lower than MEs. In this model, the effects of competition and ownership type
were used as independent variables. The result showed that ownership type had a
negative effect on performance independently of competition. Vining and Boardman
explained that the adverse relationship between ownership type and performance
resulted from a high transaction cost.
Numerous studies conducted in Western capital markets have examined the rela-
tionship between firms’ ownership structure and performance, and several studies
have done the same for China. China began a process of corporatization and partial
privatization of former SOEs at the start of its economic reform. However, it is hard to
define these companies as completely private; not only are the majority of shares still
held by the Chinese government, but state ownership also exists through reciprocal
holding shares, even though disregarding shadow control by the party.
In recent years, an increasing number of studies have examined the influence of
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ownership structure and governance on the productivity, profitability, and efficiency of
Chinese SOEs and evaluated economic reform. Zuobao et al. (2002) classified various
ownership types and examined the correlation between ownership structure and per-
formance. They found that the profitability of SOEs was significantly lower than that
of other ownership structures. Collectively owned enterprises (owned by local govern-
ments) are more profitable and productive than SOEs, possibly because of more efficient
management under closer monitoring and harder budget constraints. Little improvement
in the performance of MEs (partially privatized firms) has been observed, possibly due
to government interference and distortion.
Jefferson et al. (2003) analyzed the changes in ownership type and profitability in
22,000 large and medium-size Chinese enterprises using panel data from 1994 to
1999. During this period, state ownership of Chinese MEs declined from two-thirds to
one-half, and research and development rapidly increased, possibly due to the reform
of the ownership structure. The results also showed that SOEs had lower productivity
levels than all other ownership categories.
Different results were found by Sun and Tong (2003), who analyzed all companies
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for 1994-1997 and found a
statistically significant positive influence of state ownership on performance up to a
certain level. They found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between government
ownership and firm performance: Initially, public ownership and control enhances
transparency and accountability in a developing economy like China’s. But after a
certain threshold, this effect no longer occurs, and increasing government control can
lead to lower productivity.
Gunasekagrage and Hu (2007) investigated the influence of the degree of state
ownership on performance using annual data for 1,034 companies listed on China’s two
stock exchanges for 2000-2004. They found that, on average, the firms’ performance
was negatively affected by state ownership. However, this negative relationship was
significant only at high levels of government ownership and control.
Table 1 summarizes the empirical evidence, primarily from North America, on the
relative performance of SOEs and PCs. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest an
edge for the private sector over the public sector, but the results vary considerably
across sectors. In sectors where there is some evidence of superior public efficiency—
electricity and water—there is limited competition or the PCs are highly regulated.
Evidence of the greater efficiency of PCs appears to be in the delivery of services
where governments’ subcontracts to the private sector and their monitoring costs—for
example, for refuse collection, fire protection, and non-rail transit—are relatively low.
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Empirical Analysis
Public companies are established with a public purpose, but at the same time they
are corporations. Therefore, the evaluation of their performance needs to consider both
profitability and public welfare. This study, however, used profitability, productivity, and
efficiency as performance measurements, since its primary objective was to examine
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Table 1. Empirical Findings on Relative Efficiency of State and Private Ownership
Sector State-owned enterprises No difference or ambiguous Private companies more 
more efficient results efficient
Atkinson & Halvorsen (1986) De Alessi (1974, 1977)Meyer (1975) Fare et al. (1985) Moore (1970)Electric utilities Neuberg (1977) Junker (1975) Peltzman (1971)Pescatrice & Trapani (1980) Mann (1970) Shepherd (1996)Spann (1977)
Edwards & Stevens (1978)
Collins & Downes (1977) Kitchen (1976)
Refuse Pier et al. (1974) Hirsch (1965) Pommerehne & Frey (1977)
Kemper & Quigley (1977) Savas (1977)
Stevens (1978)
Bruggink (1982) Crain & Zardkoohi (1978, 1980)Water Mann & Mikesell (1971) Feigenbaum & Teeples (1983) Hausman (1976)Morgan (1977)
Bays (1979)
Bishop (1980)
Clarkson (1972)
Frech (1976, 1980)
Health services Becker & Sloan (1985) Frech & Ginsburg (1981)
Lindsay (1976)
Rushing (1974)
Schlesinger & Dorwart (1984)
Wilson & Jadlow (1982)
Forsyth & Hoching (1980)
Airlines Jordan (1982) Davies (1971, 1977)
Morrison (1981)
Railroads Caves & Christensen (1980)Caves et al. (1982)
Finance Lewin (1982) Davies (1981)
Fire service Ahlbrecht (1973)
McGuire & Van Cott (1984)
Nonrail transit Palmer et al. (1983)
Pashigian (1976)
Source: Adapted from Boardman & Vining (1989).
the effect of listed/unlisted status and degree of government ownership on management
performance. Public institutions that are listed or have small public shares—like private
companies—are expected to be more profit-seeking than those that are not listed or
have large public shares. The purpose of this study was not to estimate the effect of
ownership structure on the whole performance of public companies, so defining the
public interest of different public companies and making assumptions about the effect
of ownership structure on public interest are not necessary.
Data
The study focused on public companies, established by the corporation law or a
special law, with direct investment by the national government or related entities such
as local government and public institutions. Due to difficulties analyzing financial
information and ownership structures, we narrowed the list from 286 institutions
designated according to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions in 2010 to
51 institutions and used panel data on ownership structure and financial statements for
1999-2009.
The 51 institutions comprise 18 SOEs, 4 quasigovernmental organizations, and 29
non-classified public institutions.3 SOEs and quasigovernmental organizations are
usually former government-invested companies in accordance with the Framework
Act on the Management of Government-Invested Companies, and most of the other
public companies are subsidiaries of SOEs.
Variables
Using management performance of institutions as an indicator, we examined pro-
ductivity, profitability, and efficiency. Table 2 shows variables for each indicator used
for dependent variables.
Ownership structure of institutions invested in by government and government-
related organizations and their listed/unlisted status were the independent variables in
this study. Listed/unlisted status was represented by dummy variable (DL), with 1 for
listed. Of the 51 public companies, the listed ones are KEPCO (1999-2009), KOGAS
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3. The Act on the Management of Public Institutions requires the Minister of Strategy and
Finance to designate a legal entity as a public institution if it meets certain investment and
ownership criteria. Public institutions are further categorized as SOEs, quasigovernmental
institutions, or non-classified public institutions. SOEs and quasigovernmental institutions
have at least 50 staff members; SOEs are those for which self-generating revenue equals or
exceeds half of total revenues.
(1999-2009), Grand Korea Leisure (2009), Korea Plant Service & Engineering Corpo-
ration (2007-2009), KEPCO Engineering & Construction Company (2009), and
Kangwonland (2001-2009).
For ownership structure (degree of government ownership), we used two variables.
Government share (GS) considered only the government’s share, and gross govern-
ment share (GGS) considered the sum of the shares of government and government-
related organizations.
To control other factors affecting an institution’s management performance, we
used a natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) as control variable for the size of insti-
tutions. History (AGE), type (TYPE), and leverage ratio (LEV) were also included. A
yearly dummy variable (DY) was used to control annual external effects, with 1 for
transformed year’s data, and 0 otherwise.
Models
First, we specified the following regression to verify the relationship between listed/
unlisted status and management performance.4
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4. For this model, 
LAit :value added; LVAit : labor productivity ; CVAit : capital productivity 
Table 2. Management Performance Indicators and Variables
Indicator Variable (abbreviation)
Value added (VA)
Productivity Labor productivity (LVA)
Capital productivity (CVA)
Return on equity (ROE)
Profitability Return on assets (ROA)
Return on sales (ROS)
Efficiency
Labor efficiency (LSA)
Capital efficiency (CSA)
Notes: VA was calculated as the sum of labor cost, benefit package cost, depreciation cost, and income
from continuing operations before taxes. Especially for the manufacturing industries, the individual
accounts in the annual manufacturing statement were also regarded as a part of VA. The number of
employees for LVA was the number of current workers including temporary positions. In order to
make calculations easier, current tangible assets were regarded as the capital for CVA. LSA was
measured as sales per capita. CSA was measured as sales per unit of tangible assets. Relatively
simple variables were used for efficiency.
Model (L)
Performanceit = β0 + β1 DLit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit + β5 LEVit + 
β6DYkt + εit
• Productivityit = β0 + β1 DLit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit β2 Sizeit +  
β5 LEVit + β6 DYkt + εit
• Productivity indicators: VAit : Model(L 1–1), LVAit : Model(L1–2),
RVAit : Model (L1–3)
• Profitabilityit = β0 + β1 DLit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit β2 Sizeit + 
β5 LEVit + β6 DYkt + εit
• Profitability indicators: ROEit : Model(L2–1), ROAit : Model(L2–2), 
ROSit : Model (L2–3)
• Efficiencyit = β0 + β1 DLit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit β2 Sizeit + 
β5 LEVit + β6 DYkt + εit
• Efficiency indicators: LSAit : Model(L3–1), CSAit : Model(L3–2)
Next, we used the following regressions with two main independent variables, GS
and GGS, in order to verify the relationship between the degree of government owner-
ship and management performance.
Model (GS)
Performanceit = β0 + β1 GSit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit + β5 LEVit + 
β6 DYkt + εit
Model (GGS)
Performanceit = β0 + β1 GGSit + β2 Sizeit + β3 Typeit + β4 Ageit + β5 LEVit + 
β6 DYkt + εit
We performed an empirical test with this model, using pooled OLS analysis. Since
the model is based on panel data for 51 companies for 11 years, a panel data analysis
was needed to consider each organization’s characteristics. However, the main inde-
pendent variables, listed/unlisted status and government ownership share, were in
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; ROEit : return on equity ; ROAit : return on assets 
; ROSit : return on sales ; LSAit : labor efficiency 
; CSAit : ca ; DLit : listed dummy; sizeit : log total assets; 
LEVit : leverage ratio ; DYit : year dummy.
most cases identical for 11 years. Therefore, we considered the fixed effect of time by
controlling the time effect with a year dummy variable.
Results
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for 51 institutions for 11 years. The standard
deviation for GGS is smaller than that for GS. This means that when we examine the
effect of GGS on government-invested institutions, there is little difference among
SOEs, quasi-governmental institutions, and other public institutions. For many quasi-
governmental institutions and other public institutions, GS has nearly no effect, but
GGS has more than 50 percent effect.
The means of ROE, ROA, and ROS are 18 percent, 3 percent, and 1 percent,
respectively. The competitive conditions of industry and market are not considered in
the mean of ROS, which is the average of 51 companies. Therefore, we cannot simply
say that for ROS a mean of 1 percent is low. Moreover, we should not make a simple
comparison or evaluation on ROA, because it largely depends on the industry sector
and competitive conditions (such as monopoly supply or demand), especially for public
companies. This applies to all the productivity indicators.
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Table 3. Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Number Mean Standard deviation
DL 463 0.08 0.27
GS 463 40.14 44.71
GGS 463 92.34 18.06
VA 463 36,076.25 102,960.80
LVA 461 11.61 14.27
CVA 463 5.77 40.06
ROE 463 18 3.70
ROA 463 3 0.13
ROS 460 1 0.41
LSA 460 55.50 80.65
CSA 461 1.02 1.44
AGE 463 21.94 15.91
SIZE 463 27.02 2.78 
Management Performance in Relation to Listed/Unlisted Status
Table 4 shows the results of the regression of the relationship between listed/unlisted
status and management performance. Listed status has a positive influence on manage-
ment performance measured by VA, LVA, ROA, LSA, and CSA. All five of these
measures are significant at the 1 percent level. In particular, we think uncontrolled
industry sector and market competitive conditions are the critical reasons for the
insignificant results on the productivity measure. This affects the productivity measure
more than any other measures, a finding confirmed by Boardman and Vining (1989).
12 Jhungsoo Park and Yuhwa Hong
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 4. Regression Results for Effect of Listed/Unlisted Status
Productivity Profitability Efficiency
(L 1-1) (L 1-2) (L 1-3) (L 2-1) (L 2-2) (L 2-3) (L 4-1) (L 4-2)
VA LVA CVA ROE ROA ROS LSA CSA
DL 165,746.4 8.58 6.52 0.11 0.067 0.07 93.26 0.72(15,125.6***) (2.16***) (6.87) (0.66) (0.02***) (0.07) (11.40***) (0.18***)
TYPE -25,920.31 -2.67 2.53 0.55 -0.045 -0.07 14.82 -0.19(10,728.22**) (1.53) (4.87) (0.47) (0.01**) (0.05) (8.08*) (0.12)
SIZE 13,381.01 2.68 -3.79 -0.08 -.003 0.016 12.42 -0.33(1,746.43***) (0.25***) (0.79***) (0.07) (0.002) (0.008**) (1.32***) (0.02***)
LEV 858.61 0.09 25.29 0.30 -0.12 -.215 1.16(12,158.48) (1.75) (5.53) (0.53) (0.01***) (0.05***) (0.14***)
AGE 326.416 -0.14 -0.10 0.001 0.0008 0.002 -1.25 -0.0009(287.26) (0.04***) (0.13) (0.01) (0.0003**) (0.001*) (0.21***) (0.003)
Constant 348,431.1 -55.12 94.30 1.67 0.19 -0.3 -275.20 9.81(8,067.12***) (6.93***) (21.86***) (2.1) (0.06***) (0.23) (36.51***) (0.57***)
DY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 463 461 463 463 463 460 460 461
R2 0.36 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.06 0.38 0.53
*** statistically significant at the 10 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level
Management Performance in Relation to Government Share
Table 5 shows the results of the regression of the relationship between GS and
management performance. GS has a negative influence on management performance
measured by VA, LVA, CVA, LSA, and CSA. Except for CVA, all are significant at
the 1 percent level.
Management Performance in Relation to Gross Government Share
Table 6 shows the results of the regression of the relationship between GGS and
management performance. GGS has a negative influence on management perfor-
mance measured by VA, LVA, and LSA. All are significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5. Regression Results for Effect of Government Share
Productivity Profitability Efficiency
(GS 1-1) (GS1-2) (GS1-3) (GS2-1) (GS2-2) (GS2-3) (GS4-1) (GS4-2)
VA LVA CVA ROE ROA ROS LSA CSA
GS -879.37 -0.069 -0.08 -0.0065 -0.0001 0.000035 -0.505 -0.006(132.73***) (0.017***) (0.05*) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.096***) (0.001***)
TYPE 15,925.86 0.71 6.53 0.89 -0.039 -0.077 38.86 0.103(13,374.77) (1.78) (5.65) (0.54) (0.017**) (0.059) (9.77***) (0.14)
SIZE 17,487.52 2.89 -3.64 -0.082 -0.039 0.018 14.73 -0.322(1,827.013***) (0.24***) (0.77***) (0.075) (0.017*) (0.008**) (1.34***) (0.02***)
LEV -1,471.953 0.09 25.27 0.31 -0.12 -0.21 38.86 0.0039(13,060.92) (1.75) (5.52***) (0.53) (0.017***) (0.058***) (9.62***) (0.0036)
AGE 075.341 -0.091 -.042 0.006 0.00098 0.0025 -0.828 -0.0009(322.7243**) (0.042**) (0.13) (0.01) (0.0004**) (0.0014*) (0.23***) (0.003)
Constant -436,610.7 -59.34 91.39 1.688 0.15 (-0.36) -324.75 9.46(50,767.79***) (6.81***) (21.45***) (2.08) (0.066**) (0.22) (37.35***) (0.56***)
DY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 463 461 463 463 463 460 460 461
R2 0.26 0.31 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.35 0.53
*** statistically significant at the 10 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study analyzed the influence of the listing on the Korea Exchange and the degree
of state ownership on the performance of Korean government-invested companies. The
results provide statistically significant evidence that the performance of listed compa-
nies is substantially better than that of unlisted companies and that a lower degree of
government ownership has a more positive effect on management performance, with
other variables such as companies’ type, size, age, and leverage ratio being controlled.
Earlier studies with data from North America and Chinese companies indicated
that partial privatization, in which a government retains some percentage of equity,
may not be a good strategy for improving performance, because few joint ownership
enterprises perform better than SOEs and they often perform worse. However, this
study suggests that the deadweight loss can be reduced when companies are listed
because of shareholders’ monitoring. It also shows that listing companies loosens the
rigidity of bureaucracy, enabling them to perform better, as Williamson (2002) also
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Table 6. Regression Results for Effect of Gross Government Share
Productivity Profitability Efficiency
(GGS 1-1) (GGS1-2) (GGS1-3) (GGS2-1) (GGS2-2) (GGS2-3) (GGS4-1) (GGS4-2)
VA LVA CVA ROE ROA ROS LSA CSA
GGS -1,586.36 -0.146 -0.02 -0.008 -0.0003 -0.00015 -0.87 -0.0014
(34.98***) (0.031***) (0.099) (0.0096) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.173***) (0.0026)
TYPE -22,099.97 -2.208 2.53 0.592 -0.045 -0.074 16.69 -0.19
(11,552.54*) (1.53) (4.90) (0.47) (0.015***) (0.051) (8.46**) (0.13)
SIZE 17,479.47 2.89 -3.62 -0.08 -0.0014 0.018 14.81 -0.32
(1,823.901***) (0.243***) (0.77***) (0.075) (0.0023) (0.008**) (1.34***) (0.02***)
LEV 8,664.58 0.9101 25.29 0.359 -0.12 -0.21 43.80 1.14
(13,160.59) (1.75) (5.58***) (0.54) (0.017***) (0.058***) (9.72***) (0.14**)
AGE 217.49 -0.16 -0.104 0.0003 0.0008 0.0025 -1.31 -0.0007
(309.87) (0.041***) (0.13) (0.012) (0.0004) (0.001*) (0.22***) (0.003)
Constant -296,581.5 -46.54 93.03 2.37 0.189 -0.345 -249.45 9.52
(55,365.6 ***) (7.37***) (23.49***) (2.27) (0.072***) (0.247) (40.82***) (0.62***)
DY Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 463 461 463 463 463 460 460 461
R2 0.26 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.36 0.51
*** statistically significant at the 10 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level
found.
The Korean government plans to increase management autonomy of government-
invested companies and undertake partial privatization while retaining some equity in
order to improve management performance and reform governance. The results of this
study support this strategy.
Our analysis model was limited in that it did not directly address the social (non-
commercial) objectives of SOEs. We also did not account fairly on the industry variable,
and therefore we had to deal with KOGAS, KEPCO, and Kangwonland in the same
model. However, the companies in our data set mainly deal with commercial activities,
and we utilized the type of company as a control variable.
A useful future study could be a stocktaking of national approaches to obliging
SOEs to undertake noncommercial objectives. Such obligations, methods of account-
ing for and covering their cost, and the transparency and disclosure to which they are
subject could be among the topics. Another analytic study could focus on the challenges
arising for government-ownership agencies in reconciling commercial objectives and
a mounting number of noncommercial objectives for SOEs—such as public service,
corporate social responsibility, and industrial policy objectives. Mechanisms for ensuring
continued accountability of SOE managers when they are instructed to pursue multiple
(and perhaps conflicting) objectives need to be developed.
Improving the disclosure of information is another critical part of wider SOE reform
and essential for improved competitiveness. International good practice suggests that
SOEs should report on financial stakes and disclose their annual reports, audit reports,
and earning statements to the public in a timely manner. In this regard, Korean govern-
ment support as part of Knowledge Sharing Program Southeast Asian countries and
Central and South American countries to build their own accountability measure.
Korea privatized some SOEs under the Kim Dae Joong government, which is
expected to have a huge impact on the economy. Privatization gets priority when prof-
itability is higher, losses are larger, or the debt ratio is higher (Park & Park, 2010). The
higher industrial share and goods and services consumed mainly by lower-income
people, the priority of privatization is supposed to be low. Given these considerations,
in the present situation, further privatization of SOEs will not be easy. However, the
policy implication of our analysis is quite clear. Whenever market failure exists, SOEs
are not necessarily needed. Privatization would be a very good alternative to reduce
the inefficiency of SOEs, and its success depends upon the effectiveness of regulations
and the provision of a competitive environment.
The economic value added size of Korean SOEs is not high compared to those in
other countries. The discussion about privatization must be considered as part of a
complex political and economic policy agenda that cannot be explained by economic
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efficiency alone. Korea must take into consideration not only domestic issues but also
large-scale asset sales that involve international financial transactions; therefore, an
economic analysis focused on profitability and productivity has significant limitations.
Nevertheless, we hope this impact analysis of privatization will help provide a sound
foundation for future evidence-based privatization policy and strategy.
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